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Recent decades have seen a dual and simultaneous shift in conflict t rends. With the end of the Cold 
War  and  superpower  support,  conflicts  have  become  increasingly  intrastate  and  increasingly 
localized, dependent for their sustenance upon local assistance and national resources. Yet this 
localization of conflict has coincided with the increasingly international aspect of conflicts, with 
humanitarian intervention and UN peacekeeping becoming ever more prevalent. The aim of this 
paper is to provide a framework for understanding these shifting relations between the global and 
the local. This is accomplished through an analysis of actor-network theory and its rejoinders to 
reductionist  understandings  of  conflict. Rather than  reducing  the  eruption  of  violence  down to 
greed, grievance, or ancient hatred, actor-network theory aims to examine conflict networks and 
their specific composition of local, material, and global actors. Three aspects of these networks are 
highlighted in particular: the personal networks of local individuals, the material actors, and the 
conflict network as a system. With these clarified the final section turns to an analysis of some of 
the primary  modalities through which global actors relate and embed themselves within local 
networks. 
 
 
Since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  it  has  been  widely  acknowledged  that  conflict  is 
increasingly  complex  and increasingly intrastate  with  the majority  of  conflicts  now 
involving  non-state  actors such  as local  tribes, militias,  criminal  organizations,  and 
insurgents.  There  has  been,  in  other  words,  an  increasing  localization  of  conflict 
within  particular  states.  Simultaneously,  with  the  rise  of  a  system  of  liberal  global 
governance,  new  international  norms  concerning  humanitarian  intervention,  and 
the  rising  entanglement  of  development  projects  with  human  security  concepts, 
conflict has taken on an increasingly global aspect (See Duffield, 2001). The largest 
current wars – Iraq, Afghanistan, and the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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Congo – all simultaneously incorporate the highest levels of the global system with a 
radical diversity of local situations and actors. Yet despite the voluminous literature 
on these conflicts, and the complications arising in their local dynamics, it has been 
exceedingly rare for commentators to discuss how the global conflict interacts-with, 
is embedded-within, and passes-through the local networks that make up the terrain 
of actual conflicts. Moreover, this is a deficiency common to the analysis of all macro-
level conflicts – whether between the West and fundamentalist terrorism, liberalism 
versus illiberal states, capitalism versus the multitude, or power versus resistance. All 
such global conflicts exist only as embodied within their local instantiations, yet the 
crucial role of these mediators has gone largely unacknowledged. 
In  the  cases  where  the  global-local  link  is  substantively  examined,  three 
analytically distinct conceptions of the global are often invoked either explicitly or 
implicitly:  (1)  the  global  as  container,  (2)  the  global  as  the  highest  position  in  a 
hierarchy, and (3) the global as a level of detail (See Keohane, 1986; Putnam, 1988; 
Singer, 1961). The first conception of the global visually imagines it as being the larger 
container  within  which  regional  and  local  dynamics  occur.  The  global,  in  such  a 
perspective, is what provides the basic framework for the dynamics occurring inside 
of it. We see this most explicitly in analyses of social structure, as a limiting construct 
within  which  other  processes  occur.  In  International  Relations,  it  has  been 
popularized  by  Kenneth  Waltz’s  neorealism,  with  the  international  system 
determining the limits of domestic action through the mechanisms of socialization 
and  competition  (Keohane,  1986).  Similarly,  analyses  which  see  economic 
globalisation  as  a  constraint  on state  action  also  tend  to subscribe  to  this sort  of 
‘container’ approach. 
The second conception of the global visualizes it as being situated at the 
top of a hierarchy, with the regional and local placed below it. Contrary to the first 
conception,  the  other  regions  are  not  necessarily  embedded  within  the  global. 
Rather, what makes this visual metaphor unique is that the global is seen as operating 
at a largely independent level, rather than a foundational level. Each level has its own 
unique dynamics, which may or may not have any effect on the others. The classic 
reference  for  this  position  is  Robert  Putnam’s  (1988)  work  on  ‘two-level  games’, 
where  the  domestic  and  international  levels  each  constitute  their  own  separate 
dynamics with interaction between them occurring at regulated points. 
The third common conception of the global visualizes it as a level of detail. 
Like  a  microscope,  one  can  zoom  out  to  the  global  macro  features  of  the 
phenomenon under investigation, or one can zoom in to the local details involved. 
Depending  on  whether  one is interested in generalized features  or  a singular  case 
study, one chooses to examine a phenomenon at either a global or local level. This 
clearly occurs in the compromises between case studies and large-N studies, with the 
latter statistically analyzing a vast array of cases while explicitly neglecting context and Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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detail. The argument is that “if a given relationship holds across a variety of contexts, 
then context cannot be so important” (Hopkin, 2002, p. 255). Yet this image of the 
global  is  also  explicit  in  David  Singer’s  (1961,  p.  80)  classic  paper  on  the  levels  of 
analysis when he notes the “dearth of detail” that a focus on the international system 
requires. 
The problem with all three of these conceptions of the global is that they 
presuppose multiple levels of reality and are intelligible only in such a framework. Yet, 
each level of reality produces an analytically insurmountable gap between them, or it 
requires willfully ignoring the connections that lead out to other levels. Moreover, 
whenever we go out into the field looking for these multiple levels of reality, all we see 
is the single, same world. One goes to look for neoliberalism, and finds economists 
and  macroeconomic  models  working  at  the  World  Bank.  One  goes  to  look  for 
financial  globalisation,  and  finds  traders  and  computer  systems  in  New  York  and 
London.  One  goes  to  look  for  global  governance,  and  finds  diplomats  arguing  at 
Security Council meetings. Everywhere we look, we run into more and more local 
networks, and never some independent realm labeled ‘the global’. 
What  is  required  to  overcome  these  difficulties  and  incorporate  these 
insights is a re-thinking of the ‘global’. Conflict provides the ideal field for elaborating 
on the global as ‘new wars’ have increasingly involved both the local and the global 
(Duffield,  2001).  Conflict  is  the  immediate  unity  of  the  local  and  the  global. 
Situations  of  collective  violence  also  supply  us  with  the  most  radical  political 
phenomenon – one which is often taken to be chaotic and unintelligible, and one 
which  often  effects entire societies. This essay  will  therefore set  out  to  understand 
conflict  immanently  –  from  its  instantiation  in  local  networks  of  human  and 
nonhuman  actors.  It  will  proceed  by  briefly  outlining  actor-network  theory  and 
examining the basic claims of such a perspective. It will then turn to recent scholarly 
work which has made clearer the locality and complexity of conflict. Finally, it will 
analyze  this  work  for  an  understanding  of  the  global/local  connections  operative 
within conflict. 
 
1 - Actor-Network Theory 
 
Actor-network theory (ANT) is a unique approach to analyzing our world. While 
typically labeled as ‘sociology’, as Graham Harman (2009) has recently made clear, 
ANT  also  offers  a  thoroughly  philosophical  vision.  In  this  section  I  will  argue  for 
three  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  this  philosophy:  the  denial  of  any a  priori 
distinction  between  nature  and  culture;  the  specific  definition  of  actors;  and,  the 
rejection of social abstractions as explanations of phenomena.
2 I then examine the 
notion  of  the  ‘global’  that  emerges  from  these  ideas  and  follow  through  on  its 
implications for social science. Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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1.1 – Actor-Network Theory 
 
For  ANT,  sociology  is  a  matter  of  studying  associations,  or  more  specifically,  of 
associations as they instigate and translate a force (Latour, 2005, pp. 1-25). The social 
is  not  an  independent  realm  of  some  ontological  substance,  but  rather  a  way  of 
relating between heterogeneous entities. This simple definition obscures a number of 
important implications, foremost of which is that the separation between the human 
and  the  nonhuman must  necessarily  be  dissolved. Taken  by  ANT  as  the study  of 
associations, sociology is as equally concerned with human-human interactions as it 
is with human-nonhuman and nonhuman-nonhuman interactions.
3 There simply is 
no fundamental difference. The apparently peculiar nature of this claim is belied by 
what  Bruno  Latour  (1993)  calls  the  ‘hybridization’  of  our  world  –  namely,  the 
increasing degree to which humans and nonhumans intermingle in the constitution 
of  our  contemporary  world.  The  supposedly  subjective  sphere  of  meanings, 
interpretations,  and  private  thoughts,  openly  interacts  with  the  supposedly 
mechanical  sphere  of  technology,  nature,  and  science.  Our  world  is  clearly 
constituted by the open-ended proliferation of these actor-hybrids, yet social science 
continually tries to separate the two into two irreducibly separate realms of Nature 
and Culture. Instead of seeing these two realms as the a priori ontological framework 
within which all phenomena occur, Latour and Michel Callon (1992, p. 349) argue 
that “‘natures’ and ‘societies’ are secreted as by-products of this circulation of quasi-
objects [i.e. hybrids or actors].”
4 
  By contrast, the vast majority of social science presupposes precisely these 
two independent realms. Objects and materiality may be referenced in explanations, 
but  are  all  too  often  reduced  to  being  merely  passive  resistance  against  human 
intentions, or transparent conduits for human intentions. Objects and materiality, in 
other words, are rarely given their own active agency; even when they are included in 
a study, they rarely make a difference on their own. By contrast, the dissolution of the 
Nature/Culture division entails that objects also have their own agency (see Latour 
and Fuller, 2003; Bennett, 2005; Harman, 2009; Johnson, 1988). In this regard, both 
humans and nonhumans are equally actors which force other actors to act. Actors, at 
their most basic level, are anything which makes a difference within a situation. An actor need 
not be a rational, reflective, self-conscious human agent in order to be an actor. As 
Latour says, under his pseudonym Jim Johnson (1988, p. 299), “every time you want 
to  know  what  a  nonhuman  does,  simply  imagine  what  other  humans  or  other 
nonhumans  would  have  to  do  were  this  character  not  present.  This  imaginary 
substitution exactly sizes up the role, or function, of this little figure.” But once the 
breakdown of the Nature/Culture divide has occurred, the more radical step is that 
the human/nonhuman binary breaks down into the sheer multiplicity of actors in Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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the  world
5  –  rather  than  a  single  modality  of  interaction  between  human  and 
nonhuman actors, there is a proliferation of interaction modalities (what Latour will 
call ‘translations’). If everything is an actor, then each interaction will be unique and 
call for its own investigation. In other words, the global divide between Nature and 
Culture breaks down into the networked divisions between a multiplicity of actors.
6,7 
The arguably underdetermined definition of actors employed here has the 
distinct benefit that ‘who the actors are’ becomes an eminently empirical problem, 
rather  than  an a priori imposition. Moreover,  the  question  of  ‘who  the  actors  are’ 
leads  directly  onto  questions  of  legitimation,  knowledge,  expertise,  and  evidence 
since  any  answer  is  immediately  wrapped  up  in  epistemological  processes.  Actors 
appear in a multiplicity of ways, and the process of narrowing it down to a ‘fact’ is 
itself subject to description and study.
8 Thus for an actor who has taken on a stable 
existence  as  an  object  of  knowledge,  it  can  be  examined  how  it  came  to  be 
determined as a ‘matter of fact’ that this a ctor indeed exists as such.
9 Or the actor 
can  continue  existing  as  multiple,  yet  overlapping  objects  of  knowledge  (as,  for 
instance,  when  multiple  medical  tests  produce  distinct  but  usually  overlapping 
knowledges of a disease-actor; (Law, 2004, pp. 45-67) or in conflict situations, when 
various encounters, rumours, news reports and espionage produce overlapping but 
also  conflicting  knowledges  of  an  enemy).  This  process  of  stabilizing  an  actor  in 
knowledge is itself  never finalized  (in  the same way  that science is a  constitutively 
incomplete project), and so the question of ‘who an actor is’ can always potentially 
be recommenced. The process of stabilizing an actor can include different forms of 
scientific  knowledge,  expert  analysis,  politically-inflected  groups,  as  well  as  local 
knowledges,  but  also  the  tools  and  techniques  used,  the  consensus  practices  that 
have become established through piecemeal construction, and the actor itself (as the 
invariant  X
10  around  which  discourses  circle). Epistemologies  and  knowledges,  no 
less than physical objects, are actors in the world – ones which shape and produce 
differences  themselves.  Thus,  for  example,  theories  of  conflict  determine  how 
peacebuilding  is  carried  out,  where  resources  are  applied,  and  what  events  are 
significant and insignificant for understanding a particular conflict. As these theories 
circulate, they act in the world by compelling more and more actors to be organized 
along their lines (or resisted). With this in mind, the aim of analysis is to examine the 
relations  between  particular  ideas,  concepts,  objects,  and  other  types  of  actors 
through  an  empirical investigation,  and  consider  how  they function  together in  a 
single networked system. 
This  leads  us  to  the  issue  of  interactions  between  actors.  The  standard 
natural science  perspective is to see  a  closed  realm  of  causal interactions  between 
physical entities, yet this viewpoint presumes the rigid and absolute Nature/Culture 
divide  that  was  rejected  earlier.  On  the  other  hand,  the  standard  social  science 
perspective is to reduce as many effects as possible to as few causes as possible (the Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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explanatory  parsimony  principle).  While  this  principle  may  produce  elegant 
theoretical systems,  as  an  ontological  theory it fails,  and  as  a  pragmatic  theory for 
producing  effects,  it  also  underestimates  the  complexity  involved  in  any  given 
phenomenon. This is a crucial flaw in attempts to make social science relevant for 
policy initiatives or activist movements, i.e. those forced to face up to the complexity 
of  the  world.  Parsimony  may  be  graceful  for  the  theorist,  and  simplifying  for  a 
decision-maker,  but  if  the  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  fiascoes  have  reminded  us  of 
anything, it is that simple theories are useless (or worse, harmful) in the real world. 
Moreover,  the  drive  to  parsimony  and simplicity  reduces knowledge  to  a series  of 
abstractions that exist nowhere and that are in need of explanation themselves. As 
Jane Bennett (2005, p. 455) argues: 
  
The active power of assemblages [i.e. actor-networks] is concealed under 
the  rubric  of  (social)  structures,  (cultural)  contexts,  (religious)  settings, 
(economic)  climates,  or  (environmental)  conditions  –  terms  which 
denote passive backgrounds or, at most, states of affairs whose sole power is 
the  negative  one  of  constraint  or  resistance.  Structures,  surroundings, 
contexts, and environments name background settings rather than spirited 
actants. 
 
To remedy this reduction of the active power of an actor-network, we raise Bruno 
Latour’s  distinction  between  ‘intermediaries’  and  ‘mediators’.  Whereas  the  former 
refers  to  actors  who  cleanly  propagate  the  causes  that  instigate  them  (e.g. 
explanations in the form of “an individual is a mere puppet of social forces”, or “the 
individual  is  playing  a  functional,  structural  role”),  the  latter  refers  to  actors  who 
transform  the  forces  that  pass  through  them.  Rather  than  a  social  force  acting 
smoothly on an individual (regardless of how many actors it must pass through), the 
notion of mediators highlights the role that each actor plays in contributing to the 
propagation of any action. 
This entails a number of significant consequences. First, the entire chain of 
a  network  becomes  potentially  significant  to  understanding  the  effects.  In  actor-
network theory’s terms, we must ‘trace’ the connections – a necessarily empirical and 
patient  project. Second,  ontologically speaking, reduction  becomes  not  an a priori 
assumption  (e.g.  “the  phenomenon  is  clearly  caused  by  power  relations,  or  by 
knowledge epistemes, or by balances of power, etc.”), but rather something which 
must itself be slowly and painstakingly constructed. The work of reduction in science 
is something that takes numerous scientists, and numerous experiments, to produce. 
Third, the division between the global and the local – the mystery that we started 
this paper with, becomes resolvable. The gap between the two becomes reconfigured 
in terms of a chain of mediators; the way in which they affect each other is through Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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this  network  of  actors  which  links  them  in  a  highly  specific  configuration.  ANT’s 
renewed  definition  thus  gives  scientific  meaning  to  the  emergence  of  such 
distinctions, and provides concrete answers as to how the global interacts with the 
local. 
 
1.2 – Flattening the Global 
 
The  problem  we  started  with  at  the  beginning  of  the  paper  was  the  problems 
concerning  three  analytically  distinct  conceptions  of  the  global:  (1)  the  global  as 
container, (2) the global as the top position in a hierarchy, and (3) the global as a 
level of detail. As we noted, they are incapable of accurately explaining the relations 
between levels and ignore that when we go to look for the global’s operations, we 
only find more local areas. 
What we have then is a single plane of existence, rather than differing levels 
of reality. What distinguishes the global from the local, as we will see, is the differing 
size  of  the  actors –  though  the  precise  meaning  of  the  term  ‘size’  remains  to  be 
explained.  What  we  typically  call  the  ‘global’  is  therefore  not  a  matter  of 
incommensurable  levels  of  reality,  but  is  rather  comprised  entirely  of  the  largest 
actors in  the  world. Yet  the existence  of  these macro-actors  causes  us to  run into 
another problem. If, as our analysis has argued, the world consists of actors acting 
according to their own immanent dynamics and logic, it would appear impossible 
that  something  like  a  macro-actor  would  ever  arise.  The  chaos  of  multiple, 
conflictual, divergent actors would be too much for something like an institution, a 
rebel group, a state,  or a state system to ever emerge. They presuppose too many 
actors,  acting  in  cooperation  (though  not  necessarily  harmony),
11  to  appear 
achievable in a world of divergent actors. Yet macro-actors clearly do exist, and so 
the  question  becomes,  ‘how?’  Callon  and  Latour  (1981,  p.  284)  argue  in  an  early 
article  that macro-actors  are  constructed  through  a  process of  associating  durable 
materials: 
 
By associating materials of different durability, a set of practices is placed in 
a hierarchy in such a way that some become stable and need no longer be 
considered. Only thus can one ‘grow’. In order to build the Leviathan it is 
necessary  to  enroll  a  little  more  than  relationships,  alliances  and 
friendships. An actor grows with the number of relations he or she can put, 
as we say, in black boxes. A black box contains that which no longer needs 
to be reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of 
indifference. 
 
Thus, for instance, a monarchy doesn’t rely on transient social relations, but rather Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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develops  on  the  basis  of  a  palace,  an  array  of  status  symbols,  a  mercenary  force, 
inherited wealth, various legal declarations, claims to divine authority, papal support, 
property,  etc.  These  must  be  slowly  and  patiently  constructed  (not  always 
intentionally)  and  arranged  so  as  to  be  taken  as  ‘black  boxes’  –  relatively  stable 
conduits  of  force  that  can  be  relied  upon  under  normal  circumstances.  The 
operation  of  global  power,
12  in  other  words,  only  travels  through  highly  specific 
conduits, and these conduits are the object of study for actor-network theory. Power 
presupposes that an entire network has been constructed through which it can be 
exerted.
13  Power  and  control  over  a  network  of  actors  involves  (1)  constructing 
multiple chains of actors, (2) maintaining and expanding these chains, and (3) the 
effort required to propagate a command through them. 
But the notion of a black box highlights a significant distinction to be made 
between types of global actors, and implicitly points towards an extension of Callon 
and Latour’s notion of a macro-actor. On the one hand, there are the established 
(institutionalized,  organized,  materialized)  actor-networks  for  creating  a  global 
action –  the  realm  of  black  boxes  that Callon  and Latour examine. On  the  other 
hand, there are the global actions which operate without the need for a series of black 
boxes. In this regard, al-Qaeda perhaps exemplifies a macro-actor that need not rely 
on  black  boxes.  Instead,  al-Qaeda  uses  the  tight  interconnection  of  modern 
networks against those very networks, in order to act upon key nodes, which then 
create  disproportionate  effects.  Al-Qaeda  requires  only  a  minimal  construction  of 
conduits  through  which it  can exert itself reliably;
14 it  only  needs  a  wide  range  of 
actors to be affected. In the end, this is the minimal condition of globality: the capacity to 
affect large numbers of actors that are widely dispersed. The size of an actor is determined as 
much by the conduit of networks it can ally to itself, as it is by the range of effects it 
can carry out. In that regard, we can make a distinction between macro-actors that 
are founded upon a network of intermediaries (black boxes) and macro-actors that 
are founded upon a network of mediators (relatively independent actors). Contra 
Callon and Latour, what makes an actor ‘macro’ or global is not its construction of 
conduits  for  power,  and  the  use  of  durable  materials,  but  rather  the range  of  the 
effects stemming from an action.
15 A single pedestrian standing in front of a tank in 
Tiananmen Square is therefore as global an actor as the CEO of Goldman Sachs. The 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  is  as  global  as  the 
individuals responsible for the destruction of Iraq’s Al-Askari mosque.
16 
The ‘global’ as a realm is therefore not independent of the local, nor is it 
foundational,  nor  is  it  more  general.  An  analysis  of  the  global  must  focus  on  the 
interactions between macro-actors, specifically by tracing their actions through the 
local networks they have organized and affected. The global is an extension of the 
local, but precisely for this reason, an examination of global actors and events must 
focus on the local. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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What all this analysis entails is that any given social field is constructed by 
actors of varying sizes, materials, reflexive theories, relations, and degrees of systemic 
importance. To look only at the individual level would be to miss the larger actors; to 
look only at the cultural level would be to miss the material level. The analysis of a 
situation must examine the actor-networks involved in their concrete occurrence. 
 
1.3 – Tracing the Connections 
 
The uniqueness of this program, and also its major difficulty, is to keep the full scale 
of  local  complexity  in  view  while  simultaneously  taking  on  a  global  perspective.
17 
There can be no scaling of perspective here, and no reduction to generalities. As a 
means to overcome this difficulty, we turn to what might be called ‘The Principle of 
Traceability’. This principle stems from a number of the ideas that have already been 
presented: 
 
1.  the  commitment  to immanence  and  the  rejection  of  any  transcendence, 
either in the form of a social whole or a world of ideal laws; 
2.  the  pragmatic,  epistemological  perspective  which  sees  the  ontic  realm 
consisting of networks of actors; 
3.  the  argument  that  these  actors  exist  only  through  their  actions  which 
spread throughout the network – what Gabriel Tarde called an ‘imitative 
ray’, i.e. the contagion of actions, beliefs, desires, practices, objects, forces, 
etc. that pass through a network. 
 
From  these  three  conceptions  of  the  world,  it  follows  that  to  analyze  a  given 
phenomena,  one  must  ‘trace’  the  connections  by following  them as  they lead  the 
social scientist  along  their  own  path.
18 Instead  of  a leap  of faith  between  different 
levels  of  reality  (local,  regional,  global),  one  has  to  map  out  the  actual  conduits 
through  which  these  areas  are  connected.  One  must  trace  the  connections 
established between global actors and local actors to such a degree that one could, 
in principle, explain the subjective manifestations of global dynamics.
19 This means, 
for example, following an innovation as it progresses from a laboratory to a published 
paper,  to  a  set  of  colleagues,  to  a  venture  capitalist,  to  a  marketing  team,  to  a 
distributor, to a collection of stores, to the public, and to their friends through word 
of  mouth  and  advertising.  Similarly,  with  conflict,  one  may  want  to  (as  best  as 
possible) trace the line of a weapons shipment to its embroilment within a particular 
battle. The opening scene of the movie Lord of War is emblematic here: portraying 
the creation of a single bullet in a factory, and following it as it is checked for quality 
assurance,  packaged  into  a  wooden  container,  shipped  abroad  to  a  rebel  group, 
loaded into a weapon, and finally used to kill a man in a conflict. Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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Beyond the tracing of lines, this ontology also leads one to proliferate the 
actors involved. Rather than reducing the world to a lifeless husk through which a 
few major forces play out their battles (e.g. the forces of modernization, class conflict, 
ethnic war, clash of civilizations, etc.), it must be acknowledge that social forces act 
through  actors  that  have  their  own  relative  autonomy. Thus,  accounts  of  conflict 
which  attempt  to  explain  it  on  the  basis  of  greed,  grievances,  a  ‘new  barbarism’, 
underdevelopment, ethnicity or nationalism are weak accounts, accordingly.
20 They 
do not trace the pathways through which these causal factors are actually carried out 
and  their  efficacy  created.  It  makes  no  difference  to  these  theories,  whether  the 
resources in question are oil or whether they are cocaine or agriculture. It makes no 
difference to them whether the weapons used are machetes, assault rifles, explosives, 
or  armored vehicles.  An  ANT  analysis rejects  this structuralism,  and looks  at  how 
each  actor  contributes  and  constructs  phenomena.  For  instance,  grievances  may 
form  a  part  of  a  conflict system,  but  they must  pass  through –  and be altered by – 
familial  relations,  education  by  religious  leaders,  the  pervasiveness  of  nationalism 
within  local  textbooks,  the  networks  of  informal  relations  between  disparate 
hierarchies,  etc.  An  account  which  attempts  to  reduce  a  conflict  to  grievance  or 
greed ultimately explains nothing. 
  One final note on agency: if the empirical world is composed of human and 
nonhuman actors interacting with each other and inducing actions in each other, 
any particular human individual will be the manifestation of a (variably-sized)
21 local 
network.
22 In this way, actor-network theory gives an empirical and scientific basis to 
the  oft-cited  claim  that  actors  are  socially  and  culturally  embedded.  Rather  than 
citing an empty notion of ‘context’ (e.g. “it depends on the context”), actor-network 
theory  forces  the  researcher  to  discern,  describe  and  reveal  the  power  of  the 
surrounding network. Note, though, that by saying that everything emerges from a 
concatenation of local networks, we are not excluding the global – our reformulation 
of the global means that it must be channeled through a series of localized networks, 
which means that macro-level actors can and do act to produce phenomena. But 
they act only through a particular series of conduits, and not through some abstract 
‘social structure’ or ‘social force’. 
 
2 – Conflict Assemblages 
 
With the philosophical backdrop laid out, the question to be answered now is how 
does  violent  conflict  appear  if  the  global  is  flattened  and  nonhuman  actors  are 
recognized  as  making  a  difference?  We  are  helped  out  in  this  endeavour  by  an 
emerging academic recognition of the complexity of conflict. Most notably, recent 
work has shifted the analysis of conflict from being an absence of order to being the 
construction of a different type of order (see Keen, 2008; Berdal, 2009; Duffield, 2001).  Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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Simultaneously, various ethnographical studies of conflict have shown the numerous 
ways in which local dynamics are crucial for understanding how a conflict emerges 
and evolves. This section will look to build off this work, and inflect it through an 
actor-network  theory  perspective,  in  order  to  come  to  the  complex  concept  of 
‘conflict assemblages’. 
  This will proceed by showing, first, the local embeddedness of conflict, and 
how it both shapes and is shaped by the preexisting local assemblages. The second 
step will focus on the neglected study of nonhuman, material actors in conflict, and 
show the contribution to be made by reintroducing these elements as actors in their 
own right. The final section will build upon these actor-networks in order to show 
how  conflict  can  be  understood  positively,  as  a  peculiar  order  and  not  as  an 
intractable  chaos.  This  step  is  necessary  for  beginning  to  grasp  the  networks  and 
microdynamics  of  conflict,  and  for  relating  them  to  global  events.  It  refutes  the 
standard  idea  of  conflict  as  an  intrinsically  chaotic,  and  reveals  how  even  the 
messiness of war can provide conceptual traction for thought. 
All  of  this  combined  will  form  what  we  call  ‘the  theoretical  ontology  of 
conflict’  –  which  is  to  say,  a  systematic  approach  to  conflict  which  presents 
theoretical  entities  (systems,  nonhuman  actors,  local  networks)  as  scientific 
hypotheses for explaining real dynamics of conflict. This theoretical ontology must 
be distinguished from a philosophical ontology, which aims to study ‘what it means 
to exist’ for any possible entity. A theoretical ontology does not aim at this level of 
generality,  nor  does  it  make  claims  about  what  it  means  to  be –  it  merely  posits 
certain conceptual entities as pragmatically useful and scientifically explanatory.
23 
Notable  in  this  regard  is  what  we  are  not  speaking  of:  states,  ideologies,  cultures, 
ethnicities, classes, and formal institutions. Instead, we will attempt to explain conflict 
in alternative terms, in an attempt to overcome what Mark Duffield (2001, p. 141) has 
called “the lack of an adequate language for describing the social and organizational 
effects of the new wars.” 
 
2.1 – Local Networks 
 
Recent years have seen a growing turn towards focusing on the micro-level factors of 
conflict.
24  This  has  been  assisted  by  increasing  numbers  of  data  sets  available  for 
researchers, as well as the embroilment of America in two lengthy wars, making the 
study of conflict a popular topic. Mapping the micro-dynamics has begun to reveal 
the diverse ways in which people respond to conflict – joining, abetting, migrating, 
resisting, etc. – that are missed by macro-level analyses focused on ethnicity, interest 
groups,  socio-economic  groups  or  any  other  type  of  ‘molar’  identity.  For  actor-
network theory, the imperative to take into account which actors make a difference 
in a situation demands that we take into account the local dynamics of a network. Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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The grand abstractions of social theory – social forces, class, nationalism, ethnicity, 
etc. –  do  not  exist.  Moreover,  conflict  does  not  operate in  a  vacuum,  but  rather 
filters through existing actor-networks. Thus local networks can be seen to provide a 
number  of  different functions,  two  of  which  we  will  consider  here:  (1)  preexisting 
disputes and social relations and their effects throughout the conflict period; and (2) 
the personal networks of recruitment. 
The  first  significant  aspect  of  local  networks  is  their  existing  network  of 
personal conflicts and mutual support: these include disputes between neighbours 
(Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 346-351), resentment formed through gossip (Scott, 1985, pp. 22-
23),  hierarchies  based  on  material  distributions  (Scott, 1985,  pp.  18-19),  and local 
systems of governance and adaptation (Berdal, 2009; Duffield, 2001, p. 146). Each of 
them transforms ‘global’ narratives of the conflict through a local prism. Thus, one of 
the most significant findings of recent micro-level literature is that “while people may 
kill under the pretext of ethnic ideologies, real motives and interests are often rooted 
in  local  relations  and  power  structures.”  (Fujii,  2008,  pp.  570-571.)  Lee  Ann  Fujii 
(2008,  pp.  571-576)  reports  how  even  in  the  extreme  situation  of  the  Rwandan 
genocide, when possible, some Hutus would refrain from killing or even help a Tutsi 
based upon previous friendships. Through his ethnographic work, James Scott shows 
how  practices  like  gossip  and  shaming  are  much  more  crucial  for  outlining  local 
hierarchies  than  are  post-hoc  nationalist  or  emancipatory  narratives.  Beneath  the 
molar identities of landowner, peasant, etc., lies local networks shaped by everyday 
interactions. Thus, for instance, some individuals are produced as ‘shameful’ and are 
resented  regardless  of  their  class  position,  while  others  can  be  heralded  for  their 
decent  acts  independently  of  their  class  position  (Scott,  1985,  pp.  1-27).  Stephen 
Lubkemann (2005, p. 495) demonstrates that “understandings of wartime violence, 
assessments of risk, and consequent migratory reactions often had very little to do 
with the political programs or pretensions of either of the national parties to the war. 
Rather,  residents  of  Machaze  [in  Mozambique]  calculated  risk  and  reacted  to  it 
primarily  in  terms  of  the  logic  of  local  social  conflicts.”  Further  confirming the 
importance of inflecting conflict through its local networks, Mark Duffield (2001, p. 
125)  argues  that  “conflict  and  displacement…often  act  to  reconfirm  or  even 
strengthen social and cultural ties” as a means to survive. By and large, local networks 
involved in conflicts are determined more by matters of coping and survival than by 
any other logic (see Mueller, 2000, p. 42; Lubkemann, 2005; Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 116 -
117;  Kilcullen,  2009,  p.  67).  Individual  human  actors  therefore  make  a  difference 
through the variable ways in which they distribute acts of violence and assistance. 
Put differently, entire groups do not act in any coherently homogeneous way. 
On  the  other  hand,  Stathis  Kalyvas’  work  reveals  a  more  insidious  logic 
involved in local networks.
25 He shows the massive importance of disputes between 
neighbours in determining the use of violence in civil wars. In particular, the crucial Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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ingredient  for  controlling  a  territory,  by  any  party,  is  the  requirement  of  local 
knowledge about potential opponents in their midst. Since the nature of insurgent 
wars  means  that  such  opponents  can  hide  within  the  civilian  population,  the 
occupying force relies upon networks of informants. Perhaps surprisingly, as Kalyvas 
amply shows through a lengthy set of historical examples, there is never any shortage 
of denunciations. While some of these denunciations are correct, the vast majority 
are the results of local disputes, with neighbours blaming each other as a means to 
resolve  personal  conflicts.  As  Kalyvas  (2006,  p.  332)  argues,  “violence  is  often  a 
reflection rather than a transgression of neighbourliness.” In addition, therefore, to 
the logic of survival and coping, there is also the logic of denunciation – all of which 
are based upon local social networks and which transform macro-conflicts into their 
own terms. Kalyvas shows that such variable and singular social networks explain a 
large part of the spatial distribution and even type of violence used in conflicts. 
  Local networks also contribute by providing the basic elements from and 
through  which  an  insurgency  is  constructed.  One  of  the  most  striking  aspects  of 
insurgencies is their small-scale origins. A moment’s reflection confirms that this must 
be the case: insurgent groups – as with any other actor – do not arise fully formed, 
but must slowly grow and create alliances. These connections are formed amongst 
both  other  groups  and  with  the  nonhuman  world,  by  creating  narratives  and 
knowledges linking, for example, material inequality to an embodied opponent. The 
failing water supplies, the collapsing houses, the lack of food, are all mobilized in an 
alliance with various insurgencies. Thus, it is no surprise that a look at any conflict 
group will find a small-scale origin.
26 The Shining Path in Peru began from a teacher 
and  his  students,  and  used  the  educational  networks  to  propagate  their  ideas 
(Weinstein,  2007,  p.  81).  The  National  Resistance  Army  in  Uganda  began  from 
twenty-seven “close colleagues” (Weinstein, 2007, p. 69). The RENAMO insurgency 
in Mozambique originated with a small group of people broadcasting criticisms of 
the  government  (Weinstein,  2007,  p.  72).  The  latter  also  points  to  the  use  of 
nonhuman actors required to expand the group, a category which can also include 
pamphlets, textbooks, TV shows, oaths, and the internet. The spread of an insurgent 
group is  necessarily  channeled  through  the  local  conduits  available  to it;  whether 
through  clandestine  personal  networks,  anonymous  broadcasts,  or  public 
denunciations. The insurgent organization is both limited and constructed by the 
local assemblage. 
 
2.2 – Material Actors 
 
While local networks of social relations are clearly significant for explaining conflict 
dynamics, the sole emphasis on social relations, human actors and incentives (greed 
or grievance) risks placing conflict in an immaterial realm unbound from the material Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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actors that also populate the world. Items like explosives, barter goods, mountains, 
Kalashnikovs, plains, paved roads, ore, dirt pathways, security walls, forests, cows, oil, 
and gold, all play crucial roles in determining the onset, dynamics, and outcome of a 
conflict. Each of these elements needs to be seen as an actor itself which contributes to the conflict 
dynamics, rather than a  mere accessory to the power struggles amongst  human actors. The 
material actors of local networks produce their own series of possibilities, constraints, 
determinants and openings, independently of any human action – yet their analysis 
has largely  been  relegated  to  an  aside  within  the standard studies of  conflict.
27 In 
order to begin to understand the power of material actors, we have to largely turn 
towards  other  academic  disciplines.  To  compensate  for  their  neglect  the  variable 
effects of nonhuman actors will be given extra attention here, though this is not to 
argue for a technological or natural determinism. 
In understanding the significance of nonhuman actors, a crucial question 
to  ask  is,  for  example,  what  difference  does  it  make  to  conflict  dynamics  if  the 
resource of the local community is oil,  diamonds, lumber, barley or coca? Each of 
these resources entails a different mode of extraction, a different mode of processing, 
a different mode of transporting, etc. The general category ‘resources’ operates at too 
abstract a level and fails to explain the dynamics of a particular conflict. For instance, 
the anthropologist Anna Tsing (2005, p. 34) has shown how the nature of lumber 
extraction has given rise to nomadic groups of quasi-legal and militant loggers within 
Indonesia. The nature of the resource allows these groups to mark their territory in 
the bark of the trees, while its transportation out requires the construction of new 
roads cutting through traditional pathways and creating new conduits for migrants, 
thieves,  traffic  and  fugitives,  and  altering  established  patterns  of  existence  (Tsing, 
2005,  p.  38).  In  other  cases,  the  difficulty  and  specialized  knowledge  required  to 
extract a resource can lead to a situation where major companies rely on small-scale 
collection  by  locals,  leading  to  a  sustainable  system  rather  than  destructive 
exploitation  (Tsing,  2005,  pp.  184-5).  Economist  Tim  Mitchell  (2009),  meanwhile, 
has  analyzed  how  the  shift  from  a  coal  to  an  oil-based  economy,  along  with  the 
nature of oil transportation has made possible new forms of resistance, such as the 
ability of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) to cripple 
economies through low-cost attacks on oil pipelines. When resources are themselves 
taken as actors, we can begin to see that the entire socio-natural assemblage built up 
around  them  is  an  actor  as  well.  This  perspective-shift  not  only  makes  our 
explanations more complex and more accurate, but is also arguably more scientific 
and more useful to decision-makers and activists. 
  Similar analyses hold for the other major material actors in a conflict. For 
instance,  the  particular  weapons  bought  and  employed  entail  a  wide  range  of 
different effects on the conflict dynamics. Again, they are actors themselves within the 
conflict and not mere intermediaries cleanly transmitting human intentions. The use Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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of  different  weapons  entails  a  whole  array  of  different  tactics,  knowledges, 
organizations,  and  cultural  norms.  The  explosive  power  of  improvised  explosive 
devices  (IEDs),  for  instance,  is  used  in  highly  specific  situations  of  asymmetrical 
warfare,  the  existence  of  routine  paths  by  the  victims,  and  the  use  of  armored 
vehicles. On the other hand, the highly personal violence from machetes determines 
a particular mode of action and series of tactics, while assault rifles make possible an 
entirely  different mode  of  action,  and  artillery yet  another.  Different  weapons  also 
potentially  play  a  role  in  shaping  local  gender  and  social  hierarchies,  with  some 
weapons being used to disfigure females and instill humiliation and fear, while other 
weapons  become  a  proxy  for  masculinity.
28  In  addition  to  their  immediate  uses, 
attaining  and  maintaining  any  particular  weapon  places  precise  constraints  and 
compels certain organizational forms to arise: the maintenance and use of weapons 
requires highly specific skills which will shape how battles are fought and violence is 
used.  An  entire  socio-technical  assemblage  of  organizations,  tools,  economics, 
practices, supply chains, and information flows, must be constructed around the use 
and maintenance of each specific weapon. Insurgents in Iraq, for instance, have relied 
upon  mobile  freelance  organizations  of  bomb-makers  in  order  to  create  and 
innovate with new improvised explosive devices (Robb, 2007, pp. 135-137). The Irish 
Republican Army had to create alliances with the knowledge of chemistry, physics, 
and  engineering,  in  order  to  continually  create  new  and  more  deadly  weapons, 
innovating  in  the  use  of  ammonium  nitrate,  diesel  and  Semtex,  for  instance 
(Oppenheimer, 2008). This knowledge  was  then  passed  along  to  new generations 
through  the  establishment  of  education  programs  for  new  bomb-makers.  The 
significance of these assemblages is that without them, it is easy for the government to 
outflank insurgents that have to recreate their knowledge base anew for each attack. 
With these socio-technical assemblages operational, however, the conflict takes on 
the  dynamics  of  an  arms  race  to  the  point  where  Iraqi  insurgents  are  now more 
effective with IEDs than when the war first started (Robb 2007, p. 135). 
  Beyond  the  knowledge  and  ingredients  to  use,  maintain,  and  create 
weaponry,  there  is  also  the  major  issue  of  securing  a  supply  of  either  ready-made 
weapons or the tools and components to create one’s own weapons. Gun-brokering 
has  surged  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  with  massive  amounts  of  illicit  and 
untracked arms flooding into the market with the collapse of the USSR (see Stohl 
and  Grillot,  2009,  p.  108;  Keen,  2008,  p.  39).  As  Mats  Berdal  (2009,  p.  64)  notes, 
“criminal actors and activities have played a critical role in sustaining the war effort of 
belligerents  in  contemporary  intra-state  conflict.”  This  increase  in  deterritorialized 
weapons has led to an increased influx of weapons into conflict situations, which has 
altered social structures,  hierarchies  and  traditional  patterns  of  warfare  (Stohl  and 
Grillot,  2009,  p.  122).  But  the  flows  of  weapons  themselves  rely  upon  clandestine 
personal networks, and established smuggling routes often created for the purposes Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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of  drug-running  and  other  illicit  trade  (Glenny,  2008,  p.  19).  These  preexisting 
channels for illicit objects (and sometimes subjects) further ease the flow of weapons, 
though the type of weapons being traded alter the ways in which they are shipped, 
the organizational structures that are involved, and the networks of corruption that 
line the pathway of the trade.
29 The simple point that heavy weaponry and vehicles 
are much harder to smuggle than small caches of weapons, means that the former 
require much more elaborate routes to attain (e.g. ‘missing’ cargo ships, re-routed 
shipments, corrupt government officials, and even the use of existing humanitarian 
aid transportation routes) (Griffiths and Bromley, 2009). 
  Finally,  we  might  note  the  massive  importance  of  the  human-made 
physical structures: dams, bridges, wells, and roads, but also buildings, tunnels, walls 
and  checkpoints.  The  architectural  theorist  Eyal  Weizman  has  made  a  massive 
contribution  to  our  understanding  of  these  aspects,  examining  the  highly  specific 
material ways in which the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has played out. 
For instance, in the tight streets of Gaza’s urban areas, Israel recognized the necessity 
for bulldozing houses in the Palestinian territories in order to widen the streets for 
tank  movement  (Weizman,  2007,  p.  70).  In  other  words,  the  specific  urban 
architecture has acted by limiting Israeli movement, compelling them to alter it, and 
provoking angry Palestinian reactions as a result. Similarly, Israel has continued the 
conflict over Jerusalem through political means, by enacting local laws that require 
new  Israeli  buildings  to  be  built  in  the  same  architectural  style  as  the  historical 
sections, using stone clodding as the exterior. The result has been a blurring between 
settlement  expansion  and  the  traditional  centre,  making  any  future  resolution 
increasingly difficult (Weizman, 2007, p. 28-33). The establishment of close-proximity 
charges and new military theory has opened up entirely new military tactics, as urban 
commandos can now move through walls, rather than through alleys and roads which 
have  been  blockaded  (Weizman,  2007,  pp.  208-210).  In  Afghanistan,  the 
construction  of  paved roads  has  produced jobs for  the  project, lent legitimacy  to 
local governments, improved trade capacities, and altered the placement of IEDs as 
they become easier to spot on paved rather than dirt roads (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 87-
105).  In  other  words,  the  material  actors  play  crucial  roles  in  determining  how  a 
conflict is played out, yet too often our analyses focus solely on the human actors. 
 
2.3 – Conflict Systems 
 
With the various actors of a conflict assemblage briefly outlined, we can turn now to 
a more abstract level and determine the nature of what holds together a conflict as a 
conflict. The question here is of understanding conflict as a system; that is to say, as 
an interconnected and open collection of actors which attains a level of consistency 
that lets them function together.
30 In this regard, recent scholarship’s most significant Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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advance has been to increasingly recognize that conflict does not entail the absence 
of order (‘chaos’), but rather the emergence of a new form of order – a systematic 
configuration that serves particular functional goals, and that develops novel systems 
of governance, whilst also making war a beneficial endeavour for some human actors. 
David  Keen  (2008,  pp. 14-5),  one  of  the  academics most responsible for  the shift, 
describes it as such: 
 
Rather than listing the causes of war or famine and rather than portraying 
war  as  fundamentally  irrational  or  as  an  aberration  or  interruption,  it 
would  be  more  helpful  to  investigate  how  violence  is  generated  by 
particular  patterns  of  development,  by  particular  political  economies 
which violence in turn modifies (but does not destroy). Indeed, part of the 
problem in much existing analysis is that conflict is regarded as, simply, a 
breakdown in a particular system, rather than as the emergence of another, 
alternative  system  of  power  and  even  protection.  Yet  events,  however 
horrible and catastrophic, are actually produced, they are made to happen 
by a diverse and complicated set of actors who may well be achieving their 
objectives in the midst of what looks like failure and breakdown. 
 
The key to this analysis is to recognize the functional aspects of conflict, and the ways 
in  which it  creates its  own  order  out  of  these functions  and self-perpetuates itself. 
Conflict,  in  other  words,  is  not  determined  simply  by  the  goal  of  destroying  an 
enemy; it can have beneficial effects for a select few macro-actors. Keen (2008, p. 17) 
lists  three  primary goals  of  conflict  which  compete  with  and  often  undermine  the 
goal of simply defeating an enemy: (1) limiting violence, particularly against oneself; 
(2)  gaining  immediately,  through  economic  or  psychological  benefits;  and  (3) 
weakening opposing powers. However, we must be careful to avoid two things: first, 
to fall into a macro-functionalism, which would reintroduce the hierarchical global 
we removed in the last section; secondly, to see a conflict system as determined solely 
by human interests. 
A macro-functionalist analysis would see conflict as oriented around ‘class 
interests’, or ‘criminal interests’, or ‘political interests’, and remain at a transcendent, 
structural  level,  rather  than  discerning  the  real,  immanent  dynamics.  We  must, 
therefore, distinguish between a macro-functionalism at the level of aggregates and 
social abstractions, and a micro-functionalism at the level of actor-networks.
31 The 
latter would look to a specific situation in order to understand the particular lines of 
alliances  that  are  being  mobilized  in  order  to  serve  the  interests  of  particular 
individuals.  There  can  be  emergent  patterns  in  how  these  functional  alliances  are 
organized, but any given instance is its own unique and singular construction. For 
instance, in the chaos of post-Communist Bulgaria and through the contingencies of Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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history, the head of the reformist group was introduced to a former wrester-turned-
strongman by the head of the national security services. These three then used their 
combined  control  over  established  power  networks  (politics-muscle-security)  in 
order  to  create  alliances  with  illicit  trade  routes,  stockpiles  of  weapons  and 
surveillance tools, pro-democratic forces, secret police, and factories (Glenny, 2008, 
pp. 4-9). The newly established capitalist system was taken control of, and major lines 
of profit were then directed towards this alliance. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p. 
181) note, “the large molar machines presuppose pre-established connections that 
are not explained by their functioning, since the latter results from them.” It is these 
pre-established  connections  that  macro-functional  analyses  are  incapable  of 
examining  and  that  are  crucial  for  understanding  the  specificities  of  an  actor-
network. 
Such  a  focus  on  micro-functionalism  also  entails  that  we  reject  the 
emergent transcendence of a system ‘above’ the assemblage, which would determine 
and  shape  the  dynamics  of  the  network  without  in  turn  being  determined  and 
shaped by it. In this way, actor-network theory rejects any idea of the system as a 
totalizing instance  which  makes its elements mere effects  of itself.  Rather,  we must 
follow Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983, p. 43) claim that: 
 
… the Whole itself is a product,  produced as nothing more than a part 
alongside other parts, which it neither unifies nor totalizes, though it has 
an effect on these other parts simply because it establishes aberrant paths 
of communication between non-communicating vessels, transverse unities 
between  elements  that  retain  all  their  differences  within  their  own 
particular boundaries. 
 
Mereologically, this means that the system is not a container within which the local is 
contained. The system establishes new connections by virtue of its creation, but it 
operates  alongside  its  parts  and  not  as  a  container.  It  brings  together  other  local 
networks, linking them and drawing heterogeneous connections between previously 
disconnected  and  disparate  networks. But  these  connections require  work –  they 
must  be  constructed  and  produced  –  and  even  then,  the  system  remains  merely 
another part alongside the other parts, albeit a part with a disproportionate range of 
influence. 
  We must also dispense with the idea that conflict is determined by human 
interests alone. As the previous section on material actors showed, a major part of 
how conflicts emerge, evolve, and end is shaped by the surrounding objects, i.e. by 
the  entire  conflict  assemblage  and  not  merely its  human  aspects. In  what  way  do 
nonhuman  actors  contribute  to  a  micro-functional  system? The  standard  idea  of 
‘functional’ is ‘for  a  purpose’,  and in  this sense,  objects  are  precisely functional in Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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their ability to determine their potential purposes. That being said, technical objects 
also  have  an  internal  consistency  that  is  irreducible  and  conditions  their  use:  as 
Gilbert Simondon has shown, any particular technical object has its own ‘mode of 
operation’  which  entails  establishing  a  consistency  between  all  of  its  component 
parts.  In  this  regard,  they  have  an  internal  history  within  which  they  develop 
according  to  their  own  technological  logic.
32 When  placed  in  relation  to  a  larger 
assemblage, they then begin to limit, constrain, shape, make im/possible, create, and 
produce new functions. As Antoine Bousquet (2009b, p. 2) argues, “Every technical 
object  has  its  own  specificity  and  presents  its  own  resistance  such  that  it 
simultaneously contributes to shaping the social field and reorganizing the various 
actors  that  are  connected  to  it.”  They  provide  more  than  just  the  background 
aspects  of  a  conflict. One major  contribution is that  they  alter  the  entire series  of 
differential  relations  of  movements  between  the  components  of  the  assemblages. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 397) provide the contrast between the bullet and the 
tank as an example of the ways in which material objects achieve this: 
 
It  can  happen  that speed is  abstracted  as  the  property  of  a  projectile,  a 
bullet or artillery shell, which condemns the weapon itself, and the soldier, 
to  immobility  (for  example,  immobility  in  the  First  World  War). But  an 
equilibrium  of  forces  is  a  phenomenon  of  resistance,  whereas  the 
counterattack  implies  a  rush  or  change  of  speed  that  breaks  the 
equilibrium:  it  was  the  tank  that  regrouped  all  of  the  operations  in  the 
speed vector and recreated the smooth space for movement by uprooting 
men and arms. 
 
Thus,  the  very  dynamics  of  war,  and  the  ways  in  which  conflict  is  organized  and 
carried out (centralized and decentralized organizations), are radically altered both 
by  the  creation  of  new  objects  and  new  uses.  Objects  both  constrain  (e.g.  the 
machine gun limiting territorial progress in WWI) and make possible (e.g. the tank 
providing new blitzkrieg maneuvers in WWII). 
Finally, what constitutes the singularity of a system? For our purposes, we 
will  take  a  conflict system  to  be  the spatial index  of  a  network  plagued  by violent 
conflict. This is a space that is sometimes bounded by state borders, though this is a 
contingent and not necessary relationship.
33 More often, a conflict system operates 
both  beyond  these  borders  and  heterogeneously  within  state  borders,  with  some 
towns  plagued  by  violence,  while  others  continue  their  peaceful  coexistence.
34 
Conflict systems create their own space, which can contain long extended networks, 
as well as gaps and holes within a local geographical space. The state and its borders 
are merely one more actor within the system, and not an a priori prime determinant of 
the dynamics involved. This definition therefore includes the contiguous networks Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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which play a significant role in the conflict system, yet do not themselves partake of 
the violence – e.g. the arms trade networks, the surrounding governance networks 
(regional and global institutions), the refugee networks, the humanitarian networks, 
and  the  surrounding  economic  networks.  The  limits  of  a  conflict  assemblage  are 
variable, open to new additions, and subject to empirical determination. What plays 
a significant role in a particular conflict? What is significant and insignificant? These 
answers are co-determined by both the real (i.e. nonconceptual) instance of conflict, 
and  the  level  of  theoretical  sophistication.  What  ANT  attempts  to  do  is  to  open 
one’s theory beyond its habitual analysis of conflict, and to recognize the surprise 
that  particular  actors  can  produce.
35  A  particular  resource,  for  example,  may  not 
play  a  significant  role  in  one’s  theory  of  conflicts,  yet  upon  coming  to  examine  a 
specific conflict, it may be the case that the resource itself is a relevant actor. Actor-
network theory’s refusal to a priori determine the nature or extent of the actors in a 
situation is what allows for it to remain open to such surprises. 
  To summarize, conflict is not a battle between two macro-actors, but rather a micro-
functional and often self-perpetuating and self-sufficient system that emerges from the connections 
between human and nonhuman actors of varying sizes within a single assemblage. 
 
3 – Connecting the Global to the Local 
 
With a basic analysis of conflict systems in place, we can now begin to substantiate 
some of our theoretical arguments in the first section with reference to this empirical 
system.  Our  task  here  will  be  to  extract  immanent  abstractions  concerning  the 
global-local  linkages  operative  within  conflict  situations.  This  will  aim  to  give 
concrete meaning to the relations between the two, by showing the ways in which 
local,  regional  and global vectors  pass  through  a  conflict system,  and  refract  each 
other. Our focus, in particular, will be on the links between micro- and macro-actors 
involved  in  contentious  actions.  A  more  extensive  study  would  include  the  links 
between  non-governmental  organizations,  donor  countries,  international 
institutions, and regional economies. 
  Within  this  constraint,  we  will  examine  six  analytically  distinct  modes 
through  which  the  global  and  the  local  interact  within  an  immanent  plane: 
infection/contagion,  alliance,  leverage/cascade,  and  aggregation.  The  modes 
analyzed here are some of the ways in which macro-actors interact with their local 
assemblage during conflict. It refutes the standard ideas about the global’s relation to 
the  local,  which  typically  take  the  form  of  unexamined  metaphors  like  the  local 
‘embodies’  the  global,  ‘reflects’  it,  ‘overlays’  it,  or  ‘manifests’  it.  All  of  these 
explanations of the relationship are premised upon the separation of the global from 
the  local,  whereas,  as  we  have  seen,  this  transcendence  must  be  refused.  Macro-
actors  must  thread  themselves  into  the  local  fabric,  and  operate  from  localizable Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
 
 
50 
positions. They exist immediately as a unity of both the global and the local. 
 
3.1 – Infection/Contagion 
 
The  first  two  modes  stems  in  part  from  David  Kilcullen’s  ethnographic  work  in 
Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan. It is responsible for producing what he calls “the 
accidental guerrilla”: individuals who are not ideologically driven, but rather acting to 
resist a foreign presence (Kilcullen, 2008, pp. 34-38). The production of such subjects 
takes  place in four stages: it  typically  begins  when  a macro-actor  (al-Qaeda is  the 
most common in recent conflicts) establishes itself into a local network. The macro-
actor then aims at spreading itself and diffusing its ideology to the surrounding areas, 
often  using  its  newfound  safe  haven  as  a  space  for  planning  attacks.  Thirdly,  as  a 
response  to  the  macro-actors’  actions,  other  macro-actors  (the  United  States 
military,  typically)  enter into  the  network  and initiate  a  conflict.  Finally,  the local 
network rejects the interventionist macro-actor and sides with the first group. We see 
here a number of different ways in which the global immediately interacts with the 
local. 
First, there is the initial mode of infection, integrating a macro-actor into 
the  local  network.  This  occurs  through  a  variety  of  transferrable  mechanisms, 
including  agreements  with  the  government,  intermarriage  with  local  individuals, 
setting  up  businesses,  operating  training  camps,  and  becoming  involved  and 
partnered with any number of black market operations. In this way, the macro-actor 
ties itself into the fabric of a preexisting assemblage, becoming indistinguishable from 
it at many levels. The infection modality is unique to situations where a foreign rebel 
group enters into a new network and attempts to become a part of it, intertwining 
itself with the immediate surroundings. In modern times, this has typically taken the 
form of a foreign macro-actor installing itself in a local network in order to establish a 
new  space  for  action,  as  al-Qaeda  has  done  in  both  Sudan  and  Afghanistan. 
Historically,  though,  it  has  also  included  nomadic  micro-actors,  who  either  force 
their way into the borderlands of an empire, or who are recruited by representatives 
of an empire as protection for the frontiers (van der Pijl, 2007, pp. 82-89). 
The  more  general  second  mode,  contagion,  operates  through  the 
intentional spread of certain ‘ideological frames’ (worldview-assemblages consisting 
of narratives, concepts, theories, and practices) which are transferred through texts, 
schools, personal networks, radio broadcasts, pamphlets, madrassas, etc. This aims at 
altering the relations between the local network and its environment, and its own 
internal  self-relations.  At  its  most  radical  level,  even  individual  subjectivities  and 
phenomenologies are altered by being framed from the surrounding assemblage.
36,37 
A major  part  of  this  process is the shifting  of local  phenomenological  perceptions 
from  their  often  limited  local  focus  (i.e.  events  are  understood  in  terms  of  the Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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immediate surroundings and local habits) to a more global focus (i.e. where events 
become allied to meta-narratives that construct a particular ‘far enemy’ as the one 
responsible for grievances). This shift is attained  through  a  multiplicity  of  affective 
and  cognitive  means,  often  unique  to  the  situation  at  hand.  Yet  in  any  situation 
where  an  actor  aims  to  grow,  such  modes  are  crucial  for  its  success  and  for  its 
strength. 
On the other hand, the absence of these mechanisms for the state can help 
to  explain  cases  of  state  failure.  For  instance,  a  major  part  of  a  state’s  legitimacy 
derives from establishing a network through which certain ideological narratives are 
passed along, whether this be through education, stories, traditions, or symbols. In 
this perspective, a state’s lack of capacity is not simply the inexistence of governance, 
but  rather  the  inability  of  the  state-qua-macro-actor  to  extend  its  network  of 
intermediaries  into  particular  areas.  Areas  where  the  state  is  unable  to  govern 
effectively  are  revealing  of  the  requirements  necessary  for  the  state-network  to 
function in  normal situations:  the existence  of  things like  transportation  networks 
and communication linkages, the overcoming of geographical barriers, the ability to 
effectively transmit economic flows to particular areas, and the ability to monitor and 
enforce compliance with national programs.
38 The absence of one or more of these 
can make it increasingly difficult for the state to act on a large-scale level, and can 
reduce it to being an actor no larger than any other in the area. It effectively shows 
that the state is a mere difference in degree between other actors, and not a difference 
in kind. 
 
3.2 – Alliance 
 
The second major  mode  of interaction,  alliance, refers  to  the  tendency for micro-
actors to cooperate with the local representatives of macro-actors in order to further 
their  own  aims.  While  this  is  given a  prominent  role  in  Kalyvas’  work,  it  arises  in 
numerous  other  studies  as  well,  suggesting  it  is  a  widespread  mechanism  (See 
Lubkemann, 2005; Kalyvas, 2006). As such, it is arguably one of the primary ways in 
which  a  global  conflict  is  inflected  through  a  local  prism.  The  specific  mode  of 
alliance  often  takes  the  form  of  denunciation.  Since  the  controlling  force  of  a 
particular  territory  requires  information  about  defectors,  they  turn  to  local 
individuals for assistance. Most of the time the information that emerges from these 
denunciations  is  the  result  of  local  disputes  rather  than  accurate  denunciations 
(Lubkemann, 2005,  p. 498). People spread rumours  or  use  the local  authorities  as 
means  to  further  their  own  goals,  and  avoid  any  direct  retaliation  against  an 
opponent. Despite the frequently false information, the mechanism has the effect of 
playing a massive role in determining the use and scope of violence, thereby playing a 
large role in the overall dynamics of the conflict. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2 (2010) 
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  A similar dynamic occurs between occupying forces and local leaders, who 
come  from  a  variety  of  different  authority  centers,  “including  tribal  structures, 
insurgent  or  terrorist  networks, local mosques,  business and  criminal  networks, … 
government  structures,  political  and  religious  parties,  and  official  and  ‘unofficial’ 
security forces.”  (Kilcullen, 2009,  p. 158.) Within  these  competing leadership  roles, 
the  crucial  individuals  are  those  crossing  over  a  number  of  different  networks 
(Kilcullen, 2009,  p. 158) –  what Malcolm  Gladwell  (2000)  has  called  ‘connectors’: 
individuals  with  an  unusually  large  number  of  social  connections  and  that  play  a 
major  role  in  passing  along  information  and  in  influencing  others  to  adopt  new 
practices  and  approaches.  Simply  because  of  their  structural  position  in  a  social 
network,  these  individuals  largely  determine  whether  certain  memes  and  practices 
diffuse  and  spread,  or  retreat  and  perish.  Alliance,  therefore,  takes  on  another 
modality by connecting not with a wide range of everyday people, but by connecting 
with a few key nodes in the local network. 
  Alliances  are  thus  largely  the  composition  of  a  unique  assemblage 
consisting of, on the one hand, personal networks, social gossip, everyday disputes, 
and  habitual  systems  of  authority,  and  on  the  other  hand,  a  large  collection  of 
weapons, trained and untrained fighters, and access to resources. The transferring of 
information in one direction, and the reciprocal transferring of violent or non-violent 
support in the other direction, is what constitutes the logic of this mechanism. 
 
3.3 – Leverage/Cascade 
 
While the other two modes have focused on the ways in which actors external to the 
conflict system interact  with  the  local  dynamics, it is also  the  case  that small-scale 
actors are increasingly aiming outwards at large-ranging actions. This is particularly 
the case with the leverage modality, which we can see operating in terrorism and the 
rise  of  ‘global  guerrillas’,  along  with  their  emerging  awareness  of  the  material  and 
immaterial networks which constitute the fabric of a conflict system (Robb, 2007). 
These actors recognize that the global is intimately intertwined with the local, and 
that small-scale actions can have vast global repercussions. For instance, the power 
grids,  power  plants,  electrical  engineers,  transmission  lines  and  electrical  towers  in 
Iraq have been the subject of numerous attacks (Robb, 2007, pp. 52-4). Other crucial 
infrastructure  networks  of  the  state  system  have  also  been  attacked,  such  as 
transportation  routes,  oil  pipelines,  and  even  multinational  companies.  In  Iraq, 
insurgents  have  used kidnapping  and  assassination  on key foreign  companies  (e.g. 
food providers or shipping companies) in order to leverage these small actions for 
large effects (Robb, 2007, pp. 54-57). 
A particular variant of the leverage modality is what John Robb calls the 
cascade mode, which operates by disrupting a single node, which then forces excess Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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flows into other channels, overloading them and ultimately leading to a cascade of 
failures. The most obvious example is of electricity, whereby the disruption of a single 
crucial  substation  can  lead  to  a  cascade  of  failures  throughout  the  surrounding 
network. But  a similar mechanism  holds for  disrupting  traffic flows (as exemplified 
when a road is closed or blocked, and side streets become congested and jammed), 
oil flows (as disrupting a pipeline or blockading a shipping channel restrict the flow 
and drive up prices), and information flows (with Denial-of-Service attacks being a 
common tactic for taking down a website). 
  What  these  events  share  is  a  similar  mode  of  leveraging,  which  is  the 
exertion of force upon a key node in a (often nonhuman) network, which then has 
disproportionate  ramifications  throughout  the  entire  assemblage.  It  belies  the 
standard idea that small causes equal small effects, and is premised upon the science 
of  complexity  and  networks.
39  This  mechanism  operates  not  only  through 
intentional action, but also through unintended events, such as the massive blackout 
that occurred in North America in 2003 (Bennett, 2005). The key point is merely that 
a local scale can transform a micro-actor into a macro-actor merely by virtue of its 
relative  structural  placement  within  the  assemblage,  thus  providing  another 
mechanism through which micro- and macro-actors become related in conflict. 
 
3.4 – Aggregation 
 
Finally, we come to the fourth mode of global-local connection,  aggregation. This 
typically  takes  the form  of  a sort  of minimal-level  conflict,  using  what  James Scott 
(1985) has called the ‘weapons of the weak’. It operates through highly decentralized 
and widely dispersed means. Often without any coordination, tactics such as “foot 
dragging,  dissimulation,  desertion,  false  compliance,  pilfering,  feigned  ignorance, 
slander, arson, sabotage, and so on” (Scott, 1985, p. xvi) can be easily used by people 
in their everyday lives to resist the imposition of various forms of order. While, on 
their  own,  any  single  instance  of  these  actions  would  be  useless  and  at  best  a 
nuisance, over a period of time and scale, these small acts accumulate into a much 
grander mode of resistance. As Scott (1985, pp. 35-6) writes: 
 
Multiplied  many  thousandfold, such  petty  acts  of  resistance  by  peasants 
may in the end make an utter shambles of the policies dreamed up by their 
would-be superiors in the capital.…Whatever the response, we must not 
miss  the  fact  that  the  action  of  the  peasantry  has  thus  changed  or 
narrowed the policy options available to the state. It is in this fashion, and 
not through revolts, let alone legal political pressure, that the peasantry has 
classically made its political presence felt. 
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As we can tell from these instances, unlike the logic of leverage, aggregation does not 
seek  to  aim  its  force  at  a  particular  point,  but  rather  operates  in  a  dispersed  and 
accumulative manner. The state’s ability to use its black boxes of power in order to 
cleanly  propagate  actions from  the  capital  to  the surrounding  periphery  has  been 
disrupted as some of these black boxes slightly alter the orders – not enough to draw 
attention to a ‘malfunctioning’ box, but enough to aggregate into a force that leaves 
the original orders in ruins. 
These four modes of immediate global/local connection do not constitute 
a full and final set, nor do they constitute universal modes inherent to every conflict. 
Rather, they highlight certain regularities in the relations between the ways in which 
small-scale  network  settings  affect  and  are  affected  by  large-sized  macro-actors. 
Future  research  can  and  should  aim  to  discern  more,  while  following  the  general 
constraint that the global is not a separate realm from the local. 
 
4 – Conclusion 
 
The main result of the preceding discussion has been to show the usefulness of actor-
network  theory  for  understanding  conflict  dynamics,  and  to  set  forth  a  research 
program  for  future  study.  Reconfiguring  the  relation  between  the  local  and  the 
global  entails  a  number  of  philosophical,  empirical,  and  methodological 
consequences that have only begun to be outlined here. Recent studies in conflict 
have in  various  ways  contributed  to  this rethinking,  but  the  aim  now must  be  to 
synthesize this disparate work into a coherent framework for understanding systemic 
dynamics. Finally, the different modes through which global actors act through local 
networks has revealed some of the major processes involved in modern conflict. 
  Future  research  would  tend  in  two  major  directions:  an  empirical  and 
philosophical  extension  of  the  existing  network.  First  is  the  local,  situated  and 
ethnographic analysis of existing networks of conflict and the national, regional and 
international  actors  involved.  The  particular  network  structures  and  channels  of 
diffusion  can  be  mapped  out,  with  attention  to  the  ways  they  are  evolving. 
Understanding these would provide novel means to effect change in positive ways, 
focusing for example, on a detailed analysis of the crucial components that made the 
2008  financial  crisis  possible,  and  the  particular  power  structures  that  sustain 
resistance  to  reform  of  the  financial  system.  The  second  extension  would  be  to 
examine  some  traditional  philosophical  concepts  in  light  of  network  thought. 
Notions  of  particularity  and  universality  can  be  embedded  within  networks,  and 
their  effects  traced  and  their  constitution  rethought.  Similarly,  traditional  political 
concepts such  as  revolution  and radical  change must  be  reconceived in light  of  a 
non-structural account of politics. If the diffused agency of actors exists in opposition 
to power at every level, innovation and change become integral aspects of political Conflict Networks, Srnicek 
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space.  The  dynamics  of  change  become  increasingly  less  binary  (reform  versus 
revolution) and much more complicated. Working out the meaning of networks for 
political  and  philosophical  thought is  therefore  one  of  the  crucial  tasks for future 
work. 
 
Notes 
 
1 I owe many thanks to Rena Barch, Antoine Bousquet, Emily Cody, Kim Hutchings 
and the two anonymous reviewers for their generous comments and criticisms on 
this paper. 
2 As will hopefully become clear, there are a number of major distinctions to be made 
between the networks of ANT, and the networks studied by something like social 
network  analysis  (SNA).  The  latter  focuses  on  uni-dimensional  networks  – 
networks  of  social  interactions,  or  organizational  membership,  for  example,  but 
never  both  in  the  same  network.  For  ANT,  on  the  other  hand,  networks  are 
inherently multi-dimensional – they incorporate heterogeneous objects and only 
exist  as  such.  Secondly,  SNA  looks  at  networks  as  zero-friction  environments, 
where ideas  or objects  can  pass  through  the  network freely  without  ever  being 
fundamentally altered. ANT, to the contrary, makes the transformations between 
actors  central  to  its  analysis –  the  ways  in  which  different  actors  translate  their 
inputs  and  produce  a  new  effect. Because  of  the simplifications in SNA, it  does 
allow for a useful formal analysis, which is a vast and growing field of study. The 
precise relations between the formal concepts of SNA and the ontology of ANT 
will hopefully be the aim of a future paper. 
3  For  those  concerned  that  this  definition  of  sociology  is  too  idiosyncratic  for 
standard ideas of sociology, one need only return to the founding debates of the 
field  between  Gabriel  Tarde  and  Emile  Durkheim,  with  the  former  arguing 
precisely  for  sociology  to  be  a  matter  of  associations  rather  than  substantial 
aggregates.  The  latter  won  in  the  end,  though  Tarde’s  work  is  currently 
undergoing a contemporary revival (See Candea, 2010). 
4 In rejecting this separation of the world into two grand spheres, Latour can be seen 
to  follow  from  the  path-breaking  work  set  out  by  Gilles  Deleuze  and  Felix 
Guattari. Their most notable work – the Capitalism and Schizophrenia series – sets 
out an immanent reading of the world, one which understands the dynamics of 
real materiality in terms of machines and their connections and disconnections. As 
they argue, nature and culture are immediately one: “man and nature are not like 
two  opposite  terms  confronting  each  other –  not  even  in  the  sense  of  bipolar 
opposites within a relation of causation, ideation, or expression (cause and effect, 
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subject and object, etc.); rather, they are one and the same essential reality, the 
producer-product.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 5.) 
5  “There  is  nowhere  something  which  is  non-human.  It  is  a  concept  and  it  is  a 
practical concept to do research.” (Latour and Fuller, 2003, p. 81.) 
6 “As differences are so visible, what needs to be understood is their construction, 
their transformations, their remarkable variety and mobility, in order to substitute 
a  multiplicity  of  little  local  divides  for  "one"  great  divide.  We  do  not  deny 
differences, we refuse to consider them as a priori and to hierarchize them once 
and for all.” (Callon and Latour, 1992, p. 356.) 
7 This proliferation of differences and interactions between actors also leads towards 
the problem of occasionalism, with Graham Harman arguing that Latour provides 
the first secularized and local occasionalism. (Harman, 2009, p. 116.) 
8  Indeed,  this  study  of  how  natural  scientists  operate,  and  the  controversies  and 
difficulties that arise in producing a ‘real thing’ was the original purview of actor-
network theory. (See Latour and Woolgar, 1986.) 
9  For  Latour’s  distinction  between  ‘matters  of  concern’  and  ‘matters  of  fact’,  see: 
(Latour, 2005, pp. 87-120.) 
10This  ‘invariant  X’  is  drawn  from  Ray  Brassier,  Katerina  Kolozova  and  Francois 
Laruelle’s work, where the X is a real entity existing outside of discourse, power, 
knowledge,  or  representation,  and  which  unilateralizes  its  own  thought.  (See 
Brassier, 2001, pp. 184-191; Kolozova, 2006; Laruelle, 2009.) 
11Robert  Keohane  makes  the  important  distinction  between  cooperation  and 
harmony.  The  latter  occurs  when  actors  act  together  out  of  mutually  shared 
interests  –  in  this  case,  there  is  no  discord  that  needs  to  be  overcome. 
Cooperation, on the other hand, only occurs when there is discord among actors, 
and  they  must  be  brought  together  in  order  to  operate  as  a  cohesive  unit. 
(Keohane, 1984, p. 51-55.) 
12‘Power’  must  be  understood  in  all  of  its  multi-faceted  senses  here  –  as  limiting, 
commanding, constructive, organizing, creative, determining, etc. It is the ability 
to make a difference, and as such is a property of every actor. What is variable is 
only its strength. 
13As Latour (2005, p. 64) will argue, “power and domination have to be produced, 
made  up,  composed.”  As  a  sidenote,  this  notion  of  networks  of  power  should 
make clear that the notion of networks being used here is not in any way opposed 
to hierarchy. Rather, networks consist of a set of actors who function together in a 
coherent way – this can be both centralized and decentralized systems. 
14 As Marc Sageman has argued, al-Qaeda operates less as a centralized hierarchical 
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system that controls terrorist cells and determines all plans in advance, and more 
as financier and spokesperson for independent groups. (See Sageman, 2004). 
15A  whole  analysis  can  and  should  be  done  on  the  formal  qualities  of  a  network 
structure,  focusing  on  what  allows  for  an  effect  to  propagate  widely  and  easily 
throughout a network. This will be undertaken in a future work, with the aim of 
formalizing a notion of ‘globality’. 
16The  Al-Askari mosque is  one  of  the  holiest sites for Shiite Islam,  containing  the 
remains  of  the  10th  and  11th Shia  Imams,  and  was  attacked  in  June  2007,  nearly 
bringing  Iraq  to  a full-out  civil  war,  and  eventually leading  the  entire  American 
military system to change direction. 
17This difficulty is also the problem that Slavoj  i ek and Fredric Jameson have cited 
with ‘cognitive mapping’.  That is to say, the modern capitalist system is a world 
without meaning in the precise sense that its complexity refutes any attempt to 
grasp it in an intelligible way. Thus,  i ek will argue that capitalism is the Real of 
the  modern  world:  the  unintelligible  ground  for  much of  the  intelligible  world. 
(See  i ek, 2008, pp. 67-68). 
18This  is  also  why  actor-network  theory  is  not  a  methodological  or  ontological 
individualism,  since  actors  must  be  traced  in  their  connections,  with  actors 
themselves  being  concatenations  of  previous  connections.  But  neither  is  this 
theory  a  structural  theory,  since  such  transcendent  ideas  are  rejected  as  non-
existent. Actor-network theory completely avoids the agency-structure problem. 
19For a persuasive argument that this bridging of levels is both necessary and lacking 
in much current research, see Kirby, (2009). 
20Both for its popularity and the starkness with which it proposes to reduce conflict 
to  a  matter  of  greed,  Paul  Collier  and  Anke  Hoeffler’s  article,  ‘Greed  and 
Grievances  in  Civil  War’  is  perhaps  the  most  representative  example  of  this 
reductionist program. (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For an overview of some of the 
other reductive explanations given of conflict, see: (Duffield, 2001, pp. 108-135). 
21As ‘variably-sized’, this qualifier points to the fact that the ‘local’ is itself extended 
beyond the immediately phenomenal appearance of a situation. What appears as 
simply  a  series  of  face-to-face  interactions,  is  itself  composed  and  framed  by  an 
extended  network  of  actors.  More  radically,  the  individual  or  the 
phenomenological  subject  is  itself  a  product  of  the  actor-network  it  finds  itself 
within. 
22This is a conclusion which has strong parallels with the extended mind hypothesis 
in philosophy of mind and the idea of distributed cognition. (See Bennett, 2005; 
Noë, 2004; Chalmers, 2008.) From this, the question becomes of how individual 
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agents  are  ‘framed’  by  the  highly  specific  assemblage  which  constitutes  them  as 
agents. (See Callon, 1998b; Srnicek, 2009.) 
23To determine whether and how these conceptual entities correspond to some real 
dynamics must be left to another work. 
24This turn  would include  the  Journal of Peace Research  devoting  a  2009 issue  to it, 
Stathis  Kalyvas’  influential  2006  book The  Logic  of  Violence  in  Civil  War,  and  the 
increasing use of anthropology in conflict studies, including David Kilcullen’s 2009 
book The Accidental Guerrilla, and the 2004 edited collection No Peace, No War: An 
Anthropology  of  Contemporary  Armed  Conflicts.  It  would  also  include  the  more 
controversial ‘Human Terrain’ initiative of the American military, which has begun 
to use anthropologists and other social scientists in order to provide the military 
with local knowledge in conflict situations. 
25This logic also provides broad empirical support for Slavoj  i ek’s argument about 
the traumatic nature inherent to the figure of the Neighbour. Contra the religious 
idea  of  ‘love  thy  neighbour’,   i ek  shows  that  it  is  the  absolute  foreignness 
embodied in  the  Neighbour  which sparks  the most monstrous  hatreds.  ( i ek, 
2008, pp. 47-50; Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 330-363.) 
26 For an extensive list of examples and literature resources showing how local social 
networks are absolutely crucial to recruitment efforts (and thus the growth of a 
macro-actor), see: (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 95n11). 
27 For an exception, see: (Le Billon, 2001). 
28 I thank Emily Cody for bringing these points to my attention. 
29  “It  is  the  commodity,  its  geographical  origin,  and  its  destination  that  usually 
determine whether it is traded and distributed by a large syndicate or by a small 
one.” (Glenny, 2008, p. 19.) 
30‘Systems’ here are neither atomistic collections of actors (a set of weapons, a set of 
insurgents, a set of resources, etc.), nor are they a holistic entity emerging above 
the  actors.  Rather,  conflict exists  only  as  a set  of relations  amongst  actors,  with 
those actors retaining some measure of their autonomy. 
31As Deleuze and Guattari argue, “It has often been said and demonstrated that an 
institution cannot be explained by its use, any more than an organ can. Biological 
formations and social formations are not formed in the same way in which they 
function. Nor is there a biological, sociological, linguistic, etc., functionalism at the 
level of large determinate aggregates. But the same does not hold true in the case 
of  desiring-machines  as molecular  elements: there,  use, functioning,  production, 
and formation are one and the same process. And it is this synthesis of desire that, 
under  certain  determinate  conditions,  explains  the  molar  aggregates  with  their 
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specific use in a biological, social, or linguistic field. This is because the large molar 
machines presuppose pre-established connections that are not explained by their 
functioning, since  the latter results from  them. Only  desiring-machines  produce 
connections according to which they function, and function by improvising and 
forming the connections. A molar functionalism is therefore a functionalism that 
did not go far enough, that did not reach those regions where desire engineers, 
independently of the macroscopic nature of what it is engineering: organic, social, 
linguistic,  etc.,  elements,  all  tossed  into  the  same  pot  to  stew.”  (Deleuze  and 
Guattari, 1983, pp. 180-1.) 
32For an analysis of this internal history in terms of firearms, see: (Bousquet, 2009b, 
pp. 13-15.) 
33As  the  current  conflicts  in  Afghanistan/Pakistan,  Sudan/Chad,  and  Democratic 
Republic of Congo/Rwanda/ Burundi/Uganda all exemplify. 
34  This  heterogeneity  within  state  borders  is  the  focus  of  Stathis  Kalyvas’  modern 
classic,  The  Logic  of  Violence  in  Civil  War.  It  shows  how  and  why  violence  is 
irregularly dispersed across a ‘conflict zone’, and exposes the inaccurate nature of 
describing entire states as being immersed in conflict. (Kalyvas, 2006) 
35As Isabelle Stengers has argued, this aspect of surprise is essential to science. Rather 
than restricting and organizing phenomena, science must open itself up to being 
disrupted by nature. (Stengers, 2010.) 
36On the issue of subjectivity, Latour notes that, “If you begin to probe the origin of 
each of your idiosyncrasies, would you not be able to deploy, here again, the same 
star-like shape that would force you to visit many places, people, times, events that 
you had largely forgotten? This tone of voice, this unusual expression, this gesture 
of the hand, this gait, this posture, aren’t these all traceable as well? And then there 
is the question of your inner feelings. Have they not been given to you? Doesn’t 
reading novels help you to know how to love? How would you know which group 
you pertain to without ceaselessly downloading some of the cultural clichés that 
all the others are bombarding you with?” (Latour, 2005, pp. 208-209). 
37The  theory-laden  nature  of  all  perception  means  that  as  the  local  structures  of 
intelligibility  change  (through  education,  propaganda,  or  even  the  subtle  but 
accumulative shifts constructed through everyday conversations), so too does the 
local  phenomenologies. On  the  theory-laden  nature  of  perception, see: (Sellars, 
1997). 
38This also points to the significance of Michel Foucault’s work, as he showed how 
various practices and knowledges became a part of the state, and allowed for its 
networks to extend ever further – not only spatially, but internally as well, into the 
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biological basis of citizenship. 
39“Once  you  learn  the  science  of  networks,  either  through  academic  study  or 
through  trial  and  error,  you  can  collapse  networks  relatively  easily  by  merely 
hitting the right spot.” (Robb, 2007, p. 95.) 
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